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Abstract 
Religion emerged among early humans because both purposive and non-pur- 
posive explanations were being employed but understanding was lacking of 
their precise scope and limits. Given also a context of very limited human 
power, the resultant foregrounding of agency and purposive explanation ex-
pressed itself in religion’s marked tendency towards anthropomorphism and 
its key role in legitimizing behaviour. The inevitability of death also struc-
tures the religious outlook; with ancestors sometimes assigned a role in rela-
tion to the living. Subjective elements such as the experience of dreams and 
the internalization of moral precepts also play their part. Two important 
sources of variation among religions concern the adoption of a dualist or 
non-dualist perspective, and whether or not the religion’s early political expe-
rience is such as to generate a systematic doctrine subordinating politics to 
religion. The near ubiquity and endurance of religion are further illuminated 
by analysis of its functions and ideological role. Religion tends to be socially 
conservative but has the potential to be revolutionary. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this article is to illuminate the multifaceted phenomenon of religion, 
using a wide range of evidence and argument. Consideration is given to the ori-
gins of religion, its social role and some key sources of variation. As anthropo-
logical studies amply illustrate, religion and magic tend to permeate social life in 
pre-literate societies (Gosden, 2020). Magic is limited in its scope while religion 
possesses various aspects or dimensions: the practical and ritual, the experiential 
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and emotional, the narrative or mythic, the ethical and legal, and the material 
(Smart, 1993: pp. 12-23). Despite there being an elaborate narrative or mythic 
dramatis personae—for instance, of gods and angels—the only facticities which 
one “comes up against” are people acting in religious ways, or buildings, works 
of art, and other material creations. Religion is evidently strongly integrated and 
highly strategic in the social, including cooperative, life of a society through its 
role in regulating the widest range of behaviour. 
A religion is built up cooperatively over many generations and there may be 
said to be a religious tradition. Although the approach is partial it has proved 
possible to utilize the notion of a belief system in respect of religion, given that 
various elements interconnect in complex ways. There is a certain “freedom of 
action” in the cooperative elaboration of the ideas overtime flowing from the fact 
that the constraints in terms of the facticities are indeed relatively limited. Reli-
gion may be said to meet human needs but in no sense is it a straightforward 
manifestation of them; people experience it as meaningful substantially as a re-
sult of acculturation (plainly, often from early childhood). Correlatively, it is of-
ten the case that those adults encountering a religion for the first time experience 
the whole, or at least some elements of it, as bizarre (consider, for instance, the 
doctrine of the Trinity within Christianity or the idea of original sin). Complex-
ity derives also from the feature that it is simultaneously making several different 
types of contributions to the life of the society.  
The first issue to be addressed is origins. As far as we can judge religion origi-
nates naturally with the passage from the animal to the fully human level, but 
clarification is needed as to why this should be so. Strikingly, although early 
humans achieved full conceptualization of the physical world, it appears that the 
outlook at that stage could not possibly have been a kind of simplified version of 
a modern secularised or humanistic one. There are, however, important differ-
ences between explaining how a particular institution may come into existence 
and explaining its persistence and relative stability once it does exist. So too, it is 
not just the ubiquity of religion that needs explaining but also its highly varied 
character; sources of variation need to be identified. An initial objective is to 
throw light on a prime source of religious belief and activity (Stark, 1990).  
2. Early Patterns of Human Understanding and Explanation  
Various tendencies are apparent in the development of religion and one main 
pattern is here initially tracked. There is a need to consider how humans con-
ceptualise their situation and then to show how this combines with, and has im-
plications for, issues of power and legitimacy.  
The passage from the animal to the fully human level is marked by the capac-
ity to use language and also theory of mind. These are critical in understanding 
human behaviour: they enable individual human beings to grasp the intentional-
ity of others, while people as a whole are able fully to comprehend that their ex-
istence is within a world of objects (Startup, 2019: sections 4 and 5). On this ba-
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sis, it can be understood how early humans came to understand and explain as-
pects of their situation and environment. Conceptualization would necessarily 
consist of two primary strands which are clearly discernible in our thinking to-
day. They arise because the significant environment of any one person consists 
1) of the (purposive) actions of people, and 2) of the non-purposive environ-
ment. In this respect, the situation has remained unchanged since the emergence 
of Homo sapiens utilizing language and theory of mind. Under 1) the pattern of 
explanation involves purposive (or personal) causation, while under 2) it in-
volves non-purposive (or non-personal) causation. 
1) The actions of people 
Employs concepts for understanding human behaviour focused on purposes 
and reasons. 
Examples: “He is hanging around here in the hope of stealing something”. 
“Don’t complain. She’d like to get there by nightfall”. 
2) The non-purposive environment 
Employs concepts for understanding which involve patterns and causes but 
does not involve reference to purposes and reasons. 
Examples: “Blackberries are likely to be found here because they were plentiful 
in the same month last year”. “It won’t light because the tinder got wet”. 
Arising out of the conceptual bifurcation, people understand each other and 
each other’s behaviour in two different ways. This is because non-purposive 
causation also has application to aspects of humans themselves. Consider, for 
instance, the universal phenomenon of aging and the physical and behavioural 
changes which tend to accompany it. In observing others we understand them to 
be children, elderly people and so on. However, we simultaneously understand 
who they are while understanding their purposes and those of others orienting 
towards them. The same person is an elderly lady and Queen Elizabeth II. 
Humans explain things because it is useful or valuable for them to do so. The 
time dimension is typically involved because there is concern with completed 
action, action in train, or anticipated action. Examples of explanations coming 
into play after the event would be, under 1), when something is lost concluding 
that somebody has stolen it; under 2), noting that the countryside is drenched 
and concluding that it has rained recently. Of course, though people may seek 
explanation after the event, providing an accurate one may be difficult. For in-
stance, an article lost may simply have been mislaid rather than stolen. Also, 
there are many situations hard to place within an explanatory context. Those 
coming upon the sphinx for the first time would find it hard to situate what is 
observed within any explanatory framework. Not infrequently, human purposive 
activities have unanticipated consequences, making it particularly hard to judge 
the appropriateness of each type of explanation, either separately or in combina-
tion.  
A further relevant concept is that of power (related also to “strength”) which 
plays a part in both types of explanation. In respect of the first type, it is correct 
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to say that while purposes, intentions and so on may be manifested in behaviour, 
in and of themselves they are non-material: the exercise of human powers is 
needed so that empirically-defined objectives may be achieved. In the explana-
tion of human activity this contribution of human powers is being acknowl-
edged, either implicitly or explicitly. The powers may be physical or non-physical 
(as with memory) but the focus here is on the former. We recognize, for in-
stance, that when a physical rescue is being undertaken a mother may lift her 
small child but not vice versa. Thus, in respect of explanation by reference to 
purposive causation, there is recognition of the contribution made by potentially 
variable powers, in this case that of physical strength. But in the case of the 
second type of explanation too there is typically at least implicit acknowledge-
ment of the contribution of power. Consider for instance the difference between 
saying a man died because a tree collapsed and hit him on the head and saying 
he died because a leaf hit him on the head; people would readily accept the for-
mer explanation but not the latter.  
One is now in a position to identify a key source of the ubiquitous phenome-
non of religion. Supposing one asks: given the conceptual bifurcation, is there at 
the same time understanding of the precise scope and limits of application of 
each set of concepts? In respect of that early stage of human development the 
answer is negative; indeed the concepts may be expected to be to a degree 
scrambled. Even the Ancient Greeks, who considerably advanced scientific un-
derstanding, sometimes used a teleological type of explanation of a natural phe-
nomenon as when they forwarded the idea that water “seeks out” the lowest point.  
An important contribution to the lack of clarity in understanding the scope of 
purposive causation concerns animals. That type of explanation is certainly used 
in respect of animals (as when one says “the dog wants some meat”) but speci-
fying its precise limits is difficult because animals are not members of the lan-
guage-using community. (Consider the question: Do animals steal from one 
another?) At the risk of being pedantic, it is worth spelling out that we are able 
to clarify these distinctions because of our greater conceptual resources and re-
sources of knowledge (although in actuality many people might struggle to order 
their ideas on what is a difficult topic). The suggestion being made is that reli-
gion tends to arise in the early circumstances of mankind because explanation by 
reference to the strand involving reasons and purposes is being applied in con-
texts where we would expect to use the other type of explanation; alternatively, 
elements of the two types of explanation may be inextricably mixed. In a related 
way, it may also be asserted that the line of demarcation (where this is discerni-
ble) between the contexts of application of the two types of explanation could 
well differ as between two early social groups.  
Even in contemporary society one can discern strong motivation for people to 
seek to go beyond non-purposive explanations, even where these are readily 
available. There are occurrences that are readily explicable but are unlikely, such 
as winning a lottery or experiencing a house fire. We may properly think of 
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these as chance events but they can make such a difference to individual lives 
that strong feelings focus on them. For instance, suppose something adverse 
happens—such as personal injury—where a non-purposive explanation is readi-
ly available, people are still inclined to proceed to ask such questions as: why 
then? why me? They also pray to achieve favourable and avoid unfavourable 
outcomes. 
3. The Exercise of Power, Legitimacy 
As noted, considerations of power enter at least implicitly into both types of ex-
planation. In this connection, the life of any one individual depends upon the 
power exercised by other human beings as well as that stemming from the natu-
ral (non-human) world. However, the power that manifestly belongs within the 
second type of explanation can be vastly greater than that entering into the first, 
since human physical powers are so slight relative to those of natural phenome-
na; yet humans depend upon those phenomena for their very survival. Hence 
there is a motive and therefore a tendency for them to try to understand natural 
phenomena using concepts associated with the purposive explanation and un-
derstanding of human behaviour. This is why religion tends to be anthropo-
morphising in the sense that concepts derivative from humans and their beha-
viour tend to be attributed more widely e.g. to gods and spirits. To take a famili-
ar example, when rains follow a long period of drought it may be that this is ex-
plained by reference to a purposive agent answering the prayers of the popula-
tion i.e. responding as might a human agent to pleading. Understood in this way 
humans appear to have a measure of (indirect) control since by prayer they can 
make a desired outcome more likely. Thus religion may feel empowering. 
Furthermore, early humans would be unable to distinguish sources and types 
of power in the way with which we are familiar; there would be awareness of 
purposive agency but what would be unclear would be the nature and limits of 
agency. In this connection, it is revealing that we have come to use the term 
“power” both in the physical sciences and in human affairs while being substan-
tially aware of the underlying conceptual differences. In science, power is de-
fined as the ability to do work in the mechanical sense and could be used for in-
stance in respect of a machine or a hydro-electric plant. In human affairs, it re-
fers to the ability of one agent to get one or more other agents to comply with 
their wishes or instructions. There is also a usage where one refers to a human 
being’s “powers” meaning their potentialities in terms of action; this rather 
bridges the two contexts since we understand a human being as able to do work 
in the mechanical sense as well as being able to influence others. We fully recog-
nize that it might make sense for a subordinate to ask a favour or plead with 
someone exercising power, while recognising that this would be pointless in re-
lation to an inanimate power source. The very fact that in modern languages this 
single term has crystallized out into these two different meanings and contexts 
bears witness to the fact that they were integrated at earlier times. The same goes 
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for the two differing meanings of “law”, the one—descriptive—concerning ge-
neralizations about the external world and the other—normative—concerned 
with how humans should conduct their affairs; the two contexts would have 
been conceptually merged, or at least much less sharply distinguished, in the 
remote past.  
Although familiarity with human action itself is the source of the idea of 
agency, a priori there is no reason to believe that agency is lacking from (say) a 
waterfall or cloud; after all each of these may generate desirable or undesirable 
outcomes. In addition, it may be altogether unclear what the scope of the power 
of humans or groups of humans is or was (recall the story of King Canute). Hu-
mans encountering a structure such as Stonehenge for the first time might easily 
have been led to believe it to be a superhuman product. (Potentially, there is lack 
of clarity regarding the source or location of collective agency). Agency could 
indeed be felt to inhere in any particular object or in the world at large. Dennett 
(2006) calls the tendency to attribute agency more widely the “intentional 
stance” and it is argued that this may facilitate the making of predictions which 
shape lives, even facilitating survival (Pagel, 2012: pp. 140-141).  
Very importantly, the exercise of power by humans over others typically 
comes to involve the idea that it is right or legitimate for them to do so. Signifi-
cantly, this idea provides greater security for those exercising power: where legi-
timacy is lacking subordinated people could cease to comply, rebel or go else-
where at any time. This applies at all levels. For instance, parents have power 
over their children but all parties are encouraged to believe that this is as it 
should be. Again, the king or ruler of a state exercises power but every effort is 
made to get his or her subjects to accept that that is right and proper, and thus 
transmute the ruler’s power into authority; subjects are expected to display de-
votion and treason is defined as the ultimate offence. Now this pattern has deep 
implications for religion and its social role. Where power is attributed to a su-
per-human agent legitimacy tends to go with it. Significantly too, the authority 
of earthly rulers and other subordinate figures with power is generally under-
pinned by the system of law and morality. So where the idea of the law or moral 
order is extended from human society to embrace the whole universe this may 
both legitimise the activies of super-human agents, and further strengthen the 
position of earthly authorities. On the other hand, everyone is also familiar with 
usurpation or illegitimate rule in an earthly context, so that idea too can trans-
late to the cosmic level. Thus from the outset, the orientation to the greater 
power in the world is bound up with ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy (the 
devil, for instance, forming part of a duality) (Atran, 2002). 
4. Religion and Social Organization, Magic 
In proceeding further, it is essential to relate religious expression to type of social 
organization and mode of production. The whole point is that religion mea-
ningfully interprets the more mundane and temporal, but the latter changes 
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through extended time. At the outset social groups were small with kinship as 
the main organizing principle. Smart (1993: pp. 299-300) summarizes the cha-
racter of traditional African religion in these terms: “gods and spirits, those un-
seen forces which explain and affect human life, are thought of and related to in 
human terms”. Such beliefs and practices, common among ancient foragers, are 
most often termed “animist” (Harari, 2014: pp. 60-61). People were religiously 
oriented but religion in the sense of an elaborated institution hardly existed.  
Following what some have termed the Agricultural Revolution larger, more 
sedentary populations emerged; partly for security reasons more centralised so-
cial entities also made an appearance. Animism receded and one finds among 
farmers the practice of polytheism. As Harari (2014: p. 237) puts it, “Humans 
could appeal to these gods and the gods might, if they received devotions and 
sacrifices, deign to bring rain, victory and health”. The Greek gods were often 
motivated in their actions by sexual desire. Evidently, these various gods have 
patterns of motivation similar to those of human agents. Furthermore, since, as 
noted above, animals are to a degree also understood as purposive agents, and 
given also their importance as a wild or domesticated food source (and their role 
in traction), they often figure prominently in religious iconography. 
At a later point states and empires emerged within which political power was 
exercised downward from the centre. This was the setting within which mo-
notheism gained ground against polytheism; demonstrating links between polit-
ical organization and theology. With the coming of monotheism, however, ma-
jor religions continued to exhibit the same anthropomorphizing tendency which 
they do to this day: the deity may be related to personally, expresses love, has 
power and knowledge. Regarding Christianity, the suggestion would be that far 
from God having created man in his own image, man has instead created the 
idea of God with qualities derived from man, with superlative addition, such as 
“all-powerful” and “all-knowing”. Purposive agency is being attributed way 
beyond its originating sphere. 
Given an anthropomorphizing tendency, it may be readily judged that the 
phenomenon can build up in its collective, repetitive, ritualistic and organiza-
tional form. A human ruler does not simply look for individual acts of obeis-
ance; no, he or she wants occasions when people may act as examples to each 
other; again, he or she is more flattered when larger numbers act in concert in 
this way. Furthermore, a ruler is never sufficiently reassured by a single act of 
obeisance; greater assurance stems from the repetition of collective acts through 
extended time. In the same way, the deity’s requirements of humans are typically 
defined in a way which involves extended repetition, as typically applies to 
prayer; there is a need to show continuing devotion. Given human imaginative 
powers, religions constitute imposing, even magnificent structures, but when 
one unpacks the detailed behaviour attributed to gods and expected of people in 
relation to them, the various elements get their sense from how people relate to 
each other, especially rulers in relation to the ruled.  
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As is well-known sacrifice is a very common feature of religions—of anything 
from vegetable matter and goats to human beings. But this too recalls the way 
humans orient to very high status individuals—as when the Queen is given a 
bouquet. The sacrifice is of things which human beings themselves value. The 
Biblical story of Abraham and Isaac provides an extreme case: in effect Abraham 
is being required to exhibit his greatest loyalty to God by sacrificing what is of 
greatest value to him, his son. He is being required to exhibit the ultimate in 
terms of devotion to God. A connected underlying idea is that we human beings 
and the divine agent share ideas as to what is of value; that is a further anthro-
pomorphizing aspect.  
The phenomenon of magic, a subsidary pattern evident in many societies may 
be briefly situated. Magic may involve an attitudinal element, as where it is as-
sumed humans have a sympathetic relationship with nature and the cosmos 
(Gosden, 2020). Perhaps most often, however, magic is to be distinguished from 
religion through the idea that the former is to be understood (simply) as a qua-
si-technology; a human agent acts in order to produce a particular effect but we 
judge there to be no causal connection. In the case of sympathetic magic, an ac-
tion performed on a doll representing a human is believed in a parallel way to 
affect the actual human; thus a link of a meaningful type is felt to have causal ef-
ficacy (Thackeray, 2013). However, in the generality of situations where a desir-
able or undesirable outcome is thought to be producible or to have been pro-
duced there may be lack of clarity as to whether human agency is or is not in-
volved: hence, given sufficient motivation, there is scope for the belief that hu-
mans can so act as to “cause” effects where we judge it to be impossible. Regard-
ing the point that magic, it might be claimed, is only sometimes effective, it is 
relevant to say that we still accept the explanation that aspirin causes a headache 
to disappear despite the fact that this is not invariably the case. No doubt too in 
some instances where supposedly magical effects are produced in a person, psy-
cho-somatic factors are involved.  
5. The Symbol and That Which Is Symbolised 
Given that it is an expression of the extensive imaginative powers of humans, re-
ligion tends to have a highly elaborated nature marked by symbolic and narra-
tive elements (See, for instance, Startup and Harris, 1997: pp. 218-220). All the 
elements in the environment of significance may figure in it (sometimes pre-
sented in the form of composites or hybrids), with animals and plants, upon 
which human life so depends, understandably appearing frequently. Totemism, 
most often found among populations with economies based on hunting and ga-
thering, mixed farming with hunting and gathering, or the raising of cattle, is a 
phenomenon drawing together religion and social organization. Within that 
system of belief humans have a mythical relationship with a spirit-being, most 
often an animal or plant. That entity or totem interacts with the group and 
serves as its emblem or symbol (Leach, 2013). 
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In earlier times particularly, the distant past would have tended to be 
shrouded in obscurity; as always, the future is uncertain and gives rise to appre-
hension. Linking in with purposive agency there is development in a narrative or 
mythic dimension (Hühn et al., 2009). Thus early Christianity provides an ac-
count of the creation; it goes on to tell us that the original humans disobeyed 
God and were driven from paradise; God wished to save the human race and the 
people of Israel were chosen as His instruments for this; Christ on earth died for 
human sins and made available God’s grace to the faithful; at the end of time 
God will come with saving power. Of central importance, this narrative situates 
and normatively guides present behaviour: the faithful are the church commu-
nity and grace comes in particular through ritual participation in Christ through 
the Eucharist (Harris and Startup, 1999: ch. 6). Hence the narrative and ritualis-
tic elements connect up within the emergent religious institution (Finnern, 
2014). 
Religion is highly symbolic in its character and it also seems possible that the 
way in which it is expressed and understood may involve confusion between the 
symbol and the entity symbolized. Disagreements between Protestants and 
Catholics regarding the doctrine of transubstantiation point in this direction, as 
does the way in which people relate to icons in eastern orthodox Christianity. In 
respect of religion, that which is called forth by words, images, architecture, mu-
sic, and ceremony can hardly be deemed not to exist. (The confusion between 
symbol and that which is symbolised is also involved in sympathetic magic). 
Thus religion exists at least partly because of the attempt to understand events 
in the world as meaningful and in the same sort of way as one understands the 
behaviour of people. To see the position even more clearly it is worth going back 
to the basic notion that humans cooperate using theory of mind. What this 
means is that each of us is constantly “going beyond” the externalities of some-
one’s behaviour to grasp intentionality, motive and related aspects. Given this 
highly personal starting point, however, there is a more general tendency in hu-
man life to “go beyond” physical externalities to make events meaningful and 
provide explanation: this is a major source of religion. (The tendency being con-
sidered here may even have a bearing on the ubiquity of “conspiracy theories” in 
modern life). 
6. The Significance of Death for Religious Ideas and  
Practices 
A consideration of the origin and nature of religion is bound to refer to the hu-
man familiarity with death and realization of its inevitability. Importantly, it is 
not just the thought of one’s own death which is troubling but also those of near 
ones and dear ones; also critical is the point that this could occur at any time. 
Not just this, but there is underlying fear of illness, potentially distressing in it-
self but which could also presage early demise. Other animals are similarly si-
tuated in an objective sense, but with the passage to the human level there is un-
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derstanding of the reality, which threatens to hang like a dark cloud over life. It 
is not uncommon for humans implicitly to feel that they are better placed than 
other animals but in this respect they are not. Added poignancy is provided by 
the fact that humans are to a high degree future-oriented and concerned with 
security; yet, ultimately, future-oriented action will be interrupted or frustrated.  
There is little doubt that religious ideas and practices have taken the various 
forms they have as a way of coming to terms with this “dark cloud”: the objective 
phenomena are subsumed within a wider interpretive and speculative frame-
work. Given familiarity with Christianity, it is hard not to concur with Russell 
(1925: pp. 18-19): “If we were not afraid of death, I do not believe that the idea of 
immortality would ever have arisen”. Yet this is to pluck a single idea from one 
religious context. It is essential to stress that religious ideas and practices take 
many forms, are highly integrated and perform several different functions; but as 
one element they typically interpret or situate these disturbing phenomena in 
ways which people find meaningful, perhaps particularly in an emotional sense. 
This is illustrated by the notion that good people will go to heaven and the bad 
to hell, which makes the cosmos seem fairer, while giving expression to the de-
sire for retribution. Yet it is striking that these concepts recycle in exagerrated 
form earthly sources of pleasure and pain, as portrayed, for instance, in Dante’s 
Inferno. 
It is indeed also the case that in many preliterate and traditional societies peo-
ple orient towards ancestors in a religiously and socially significant way; they are 
powerfully significant in the present, where they may be invoked, for instance, to 
secure or challenge rights or responsibilities asserted. (For discussion focused on 
the Trobriand Islanders, see Mosko, 2017). Thus religion may be said to mediate 
the relation between the living and the dead (Boyer, 2001a). In the Confucian 
tradition of China rituals to honour ancestors are very important and need to be 
performed in precise ways. When properly carried out, an individual can receive 
the aid and cooperation of deceased relatives. Misfortune may be taken as a sign 
of displeasure by the deceased, and indicate that the proper rituals have not been 
followed (For a study relating the position of ancestors and kinship organization, 
see Bloch, 1993). 
7. The Interpretation of Subjective Elements 
To understand fully the early religious outlook attention must also be given to 
subjective elements. Taking a modern perspective it is readily appreciated that 
experience does not consist solely of experience of the physical world. For in-
stance, one is conscious of the content of one’s own thoughts and of one’s own 
dreams, both of which may or may not be conveyed to others. To orient to the 
physical world is not to grasp the whole of experience, which was as true for 
early human beings as it is for us. But what sense is to be made of such elements 
as dreams? A priori there is no way of understanding their significance or 
non-significance. However, since interconnections are often initially grasped 
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through correlation, some significance is likely to be attributed to them. From a 
modern perspective, it is abundantly clear that there are meanings to be ex-
tracted from dreams, and it is not at all surprising that they have been taken, for 
instance, as indications or predictions/prophecies.  
Freud is, of course, a writer known for his interpretation of dreams but he is 
suggestive on another point too. In his later work, Freud (1949 [1923], 1955 
[1920]) proposes that the human psyche may be divided into three parts: id, ego 
and super-ego. The id is the completely unconscious, impulsive, portion of the 
psyche that operates on the “pleasure principle” and is the source of basic im-
pulses and drives; it seeks immediate gratification. On the other hand, the su-
per-ego is the moral component of the psyche, which has no regard to special 
circumstances when the morally right thing to do might not be best for a par-
ticular situation. The third element, the rational ego, is usually reflected most 
directly in a person’s actions where it attempts to achieve balance between the 
impractical hedonism of the id and the impractical moralism of the super-ego. 
Particularly pertinent here is this last which is the internalization of fin-
ger-wagging parental figures: you shouldn’t lie, you shouldn’t steal etc.; “con-
science” is a word often used for it.  
Now the modern understanding of internalization was not available in earlier 
eras. An important suggestion is that the source of the prohibitions and fin-
ger-wagging may be judged to be, or interpreted as, external e.g. God. Where 
God is understood as the source of the moral order and one hears one’s own 
conscience, that experience could be viewed as communication from God. Paul’s 
conversion on the road to Damascus can perhaps be partly understood in these 
terms (involving God speaking to him). Again, where one can seemingly hear 
the voice—or advice—of (say) a dead parent, could not that be communication 
from the next world? Something “internal” may hence be conceptualised as “ex-
ternal”. No doubt, in evaluating the significance of subjective experiences for re-
ligion account must also be taken of the widespread use of hallucinogens and 
other mind-altering substances (Vernon, 2019). 
Dreams and private thoughts are significant in an additional and somewhat 
different way. Importantly, they establish that physicality does not exhaust what 
a human being is. This has a bearing upon how death is construed. Basically, the 
central observational experience of the death of another is that that person will 
never move again or never do anything in a publicly observable bodily sense; in 
addition, the body will generally decay. But the existence of private thoughts and 
dreams makes clear that one is not totally made up of bodily form and publicly 
observable actions: there is more. This leaves open the possibility that the sub-
jective elements form the basis for persistence of the individual (or the “soul”) 
beyond death (and, conceivably also, prior-existence before birth or even con-
ception), so the widespread existence of beliefs of this type is only to be expected. 
The modern expectation that oblivion follows death (and precedes conception) 
is well-grounded, for instance on evidence demonstrating the interdependence 
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of the mental and the physical, but this fuller understanding is essentially a 
product of science (Dawkins, 2006).  
There are other religious topics where a modern secularized understanding 
will differ from that of early human beings. It has been noted that pre-literate 
peoples generally understand that there is a link between sexual intercourse and 
subsequent childbirth while interpreting it in their culturally variable ways; no 
doubt the underlying basis of the understanding is again correlational. However, 
do they understand as we do that birth cannot take place without prior sexual 
intercourse (i.e. in the absence of recently developed technologies)? There is no 
reason to think they would be confident on this point. Hence the notion that a 
virgin birth could take place, probably as a relatively exceptional or even special 
event, is one that could easily have currency. This type of belief can thus find a 
place within the religious type of outlook to be expected in the earlier circums-
tances of mankind.  
8. Cognitive Approaches 
Complementing the position taken so far—and seemingly with more direct links 
to evolutionary theory—are recently developed cognitive approaches which seek 
to illuminate the origins and varieties of religion. In this connection, it is rele-
vant to note that evolutionary theory has greatly expanded since Darwin’s day 
and is judged to bear effectively upon disciplines such as anthropology and psy-
chology. As one would expect the key idea is that one can understand how we 
think through understanding the human mind as a product of evolution i.e. it 
developed as it did to facilitate the survival of the species. As is well-known, one 
can understand differences between male and female outlooks and behaviour in 
respect of sex in this kind of way.  
Illustration of the relevance to religion is provided by reference to Boyer’s 
“modularity of the mind” thesis, which hinges on the idea that the human mind 
consists of various “modules” processing different types of information and giv-
ing rise to differing expectations and inferences about the world (Boyer, 2001a, 
2001b). This leads to the idea that religion is the consequence of the functioning 
of differing domain-specific modules: beliefs about the supernatural originate 
from core knowledge being misapplied from one domain to another i.e. by a 
kind of cognitive malfunction. These concepts “excite” the mind and propagate 
readily because they have the power to generate many inferences (Boyer, 2001a: 
p. 164). However, Bloch is unconvinced partly on the grounds that our core 
knowledge is shared with other animals which, nevertheless, manifest nothing 
resembling religion in their behaviour. (The view taken here differs in the re-
spect that human but not animal knowledge is based upon full conceptualisation 
of the external world). Bloch (2008: p. 2060) reckons that religion arises out of, 
and gives expression to, humans’ imaginative powers. From the perspective de-
veloped here a further comment would be that Boyer focuses on cognition but 
religion is also an associational phenomenon and religious orientation combines 
attitudinal and cognitive elements. 
R. Startup 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2020.103023 358 Open Journal of Philosophy 
 
Again cognitive in its emphasis but also bearing upon issues as to how religion 
is expressed is Whitehouse’s (2000, 2004) “modes of religiosity” thesis. This au-
thor draws from psychological theories of memory and views forms of religious 
experience as deriving from specific cognitive systems. A key distinction made is 
that between “semantic” memory and “episodic” memory, the former being 
concerned with abstract knowledge of the world, the latter concerned with actual 
occurrences in a person’s experience (Whitehouse, 2000: p. 113). The suggestion 
is that the different forms of memory underpin different types of religious life. 
Whitehouse traces links between, on the one hand, semantic memory taken to-
gether with the relatively anonymous character of communities and, on the 
other, relatively unemotional and doctrinally-organised forms of religion. In ad-
dition, he points to links between episodic memory together with highly cohe-
sive social ties and intense and imagistic forms of religion. Whitehouse judges 
that, while the modularity thesis bears upon universal features of religious 
thinking, his modes thesis accounts for religious variation. However, it has been 
suggested that there is no ready explanation for—what is frequently observed— 
“oscillations between both modes within the same traditions” (Tremlett, 2013: p. 
111). 
Ingold’s (1996, 2001) work has a different emphasis for it involves a move 
away from putative universal mental mechanisms back towards anthropological 
scrutiny of everyday life. Indeed he rejects the picture of the mind as involving 
fixed mental systems in favour of a developmental model. Our human capacities 
are attributable not so much to genetic inheritance but to what he refers to as a 
development system which is “the entire system of relations constituted by the 
presence of the organism in a particular environment” (Ingold, 2001: p. 261). 
Within “the environment” he appears to include both the natural world and 
culture and relationships. Clearly in some respects complementary to that of 
Boyer, his approach probably recalls for some the nature/nurture controversy, 
but though it feeds into the study of religion within particular societies, it re-
mains to be demonstrated how it would contribute to understanding the origins 
of religion or its development as an institution. 
9. A Dualist or a Non-Dualist Outlook 
In a suggestive early work Frankfort and Frankfort (1961: pp. 11-13) characterize 
the outlook in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia as being of an “I-and-Thou” 
type. Significantly, three elements seem to be implied here: 1) both self and 
world are construed in terms of agency; 2) there is felt to be an intimate rela-
tionship between them; 3) “Thou” has greater power. Also, the orientation to the 
greater power in the world is bound up with ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy.  
Frankfort and Frankfort (1961) are focusing on near-eastern peoples. Think-
ing more generally, there seem to arise two main alternatives in terms of orien-
tation in respect of power. Considering matters objectively, one would say that 
although an individual or local human group evidently has some power, the 
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power located elsewhere in the world is—almost literally—infinitely greater, as 
demonstrated by such natural phenomena as the Sun rising and setting; or, in a 
modern context, through our understanding that life on Earth is dependent 
upon there being a continuous supply of energy from the Sun. Therefore the 
perspective may be that the individual (or local group) is set over and against 
massive power; but there is an alternative. There is also the possibility that power 
may be felt to inhere in the massive totality of the world but that the individual 
(or group) is understood to partake in it or draw from it temporarily. (The un-
derlying logical distinction is between identifying this as distinct from that, as 
against identifying this as part of that.) The former of this pair of conceptualiza-
tions seems to feed into the dualist perspective characteristic of western peoples 
while the latter fits more into the non-dualist (or monist) outlook often found in 
the orient (Wilkinson, 2003). An illustration of the latter is the key idea within 
Hinduism of Dharma, “[t]he pattern underlying the cosmos and manifest in the 
ethical and social laws of humankind” (Smart, 1993: p. 85). Significantly, this 
concept seeks simultaneously to grasp the non-purposive and purposive spheres. 
Importantly, too, the superhuman order governing the world may or may not 
be viewed as governed by the wills or purposes of gods. An alternative is for that 
realm to be understood as governed by natural laws just as is the everyday world 
of humans, animals and plants. This way of thinking partly arises from extension 
of the scope of application of non-purposive explanation. Included in this cate-
gory of “natural-law religions” would be Buddhism, originating in India, and 
Confucianism and Taoism in China (Harari, 2014: p. 249). Within Buddhism 
the aim is liberation from suffering through experiencing reality as it is, without 
craving. Hence there are basic and essential differences between the major world 
religions perhaps epitomized by the suggestive contrast between saving souls on 
the one hand and loss of self on the other. In their origins, these modes of 
thinking and orienting are emphatically not to be considered as some kind of 
“mistake”, rather they are consequences of the way in which conceptualization 
develops (Mithen, 1999; Wright, 2009). 
As alluded to earlier, a further, rather different type of duality is central to the 
rationale of several religions which, though prominent once, have experienced 
marked decline; these include Zoroastrianism, Gnosticism and Manichaeanism. 
This type of religion provides a response to the question: why is there both good 
and evil in the world? The answer given is that there are independent good and 
evil powers—good and evil gods—loose in the world. It could be argued that this 
idea is sufficiently convincing for it to have been substantially taken over by 
many supposed adherents of monotheism who explain outcomes in the world by 
reference to God and the Devil (or Satan).  
10. Religion and Politics: A Contrast between Christianity  
and Islam 
So in their differing ways religions are concerned with the orientation to power 
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and ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy within a society. Hence there are bound 
to be interconnections between religion and politics in empires and nation 
states, but there are striking differences in the way in which this works itself out. 
This may be illustrated through a contrast between Christianity and Islam. 
It is an important fact regarding Christianity (key concept “love”) that it first 
established itself among subordinated peoples in the Roman Empire; only in the 
fourth century CE did it become the religion of the whole empire under Con-
stantine the Great. Important documents—such as the gospels—originate from 
the early period, as do certain doctrines and practices. Major figures such as Paul 
sought to convert officials and other high status people but they did not contest 
their authority in any direct sense. (Of course it would have been fatal to do so). 
The result is that Christianity does not contain a systematic doctrine subordi-
nating politics to religion. The key New Testament quotation is of course: 
“Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and render unto God the things 
that are God’s”. A consequence has been that in the Western tradition there has 
tended to be a relation of dynamic tension between Christianity and politics but 
the latter has been gradually able to establish its independence and develop in a 
secular direction. 
It is an important fact regarding Islam (key concept “surrender” or “submis-
sion”) that as it became established (in the seventh century CE) it became politi-
cally dominant in its associated territory and its range was then rapidly extended 
geographically. Hence there was absolutely no incentive for there to be sharp 
doctrinal distinction between the religious and the political spheres; far from it. 
In fact, one can say that religious advancement was from the outset partly de-
fined in political terms. As Smart (1993: p. 282) puts it: “Morality for the early 
Muslim was thoroughly woven into the political task of founding a good and just 
society under the guidance of God”. 
Now, of course it was the case that at a later stage Muslim states tended to be 
dominated politically in various ways by European Christian powers but this did 
not change the underlying outlook on religion and politics. In fact Islam has 
virtually enshrined the idea that periodic reassertions throughout a society—at 
all levels—of the basics of that faith are needed in order to express its true Is-
lamic nature. The Qur’an is the fundamental reference point and is understood 
to be God’s eternal speech. Nor has Islam gone through any equivalent of the 
Reformation. The consequence is that even today a central position taken by 
many Muslims is that politics should be subordinate to Sharia (i.e. revealed law). 
Hence the stances of Christianity and Islam in respect of politics are contrasting.  
11. An Investment in Power and Advantages over Others 
It need hardly be said that, given the religious outlook, where it is felt that par-
ticular individuals or groups can release the more general or overarching power, 
or invoke it, or be understood to act in conjunction with it, this itself massively 
enhances their ability to achieve outcomes in the face of other human beings. In 
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the modern world this is in fact one of the main ways in which religion is expe-
rienced. The non-believer does not feel that he or she has access to, nor is their 
life “overlooked” by, any such non-human agency. On the other hand, believers 
feel themselves to be acting in harmony with and even able to invoke massive 
power, also viewed as the source of legitimacy. Not infrequently believers feel 
they gain advantages or privileges against non-believers; not infrequently it is 
felt the “wrath” of cosmic powers could vent itself on non-believers or those ad-
hering to other religions. The point being made is that religion itself is a source 
of power (quite irrespective of putative sources of power and legitimacy of su-
pernatural origin), which is an underlying reason why people in the modern 
world are so reluctant to give it up (Wade, 2009): they have a considerable in-
vestment in it. A further feature contributes to the difficulty of giving up a reli-
gion: its ideas tend to be tightly integrated and constitute a “self-sealing system” 
which it is difficult to think one’s way out of from the inside. 
12. The Functions of Religion 
It seems that fully to understand the phenomenon of religion there is a need to 
consider both cognitive and other capacities of individuals and the nature of 
cooperation and cooperative frameworks. It has been argued that religion 
evolved as one of the behavioural mechanisms designed to facilitate community 
bonding (as numbers came to exceed 150) (Dunbar, 2020). It may tend to create 
large groups and facilitate further population growth (Startup, 2014). Indeed, 
both the individual and the relational are brought to attention when considera-
tion is given to the familiar question: do we need religion? Responses to this 
question are informed by approaches and contributions within social anthro-
pology which have been characterised as “functionalist” or “structural-function- 
alist” in their character. Consideration of the so-called “functions” of religion is 
helpful so long as it is understood that it bears rather less on the issue of origins 
and rather more on the contribution to social integration and stability. The sug-
gested functions (or consequences) of religion are sometimes for individuals and 
sometimes for society as a whole. For example, Malinowski (1948) says that reli-
gious ritual relieves anxiety when people are embarking upon a risky venture. 
On the other hand, it may be suggested that religious ritual draws people to-
gether; it integrates society. Evidence from social science suggests that societies 
held together by some kind of religious practice may survive more effectively or 
for longer. The notion here might be that among humans there is evolutionary 
adaptation to the use of shared rituals; they may indeed have tangible benefits. 
The imagining of invisible agents could play a role, for instance, in underpinning 
cooperative social behaviour. Religious sanctions have been prominent in sys-
tems of social control. Rather different but potentially pertinent too is Girard’s 
theory that religion was necessary in human evolution to control the violence 
that can come from mimetic rivalry (Fleming, 2004).  
Of course, there are important differences in relevant respects between simp-
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ler and more complex societies. A feature of modern societies is that they con-
tain many ethnic and religious differences. Nevertheless some would probably 
say that a society like the UK is partly integrated, not so much by being Chris-
tian, but from the fact that it arises from a Christian civilization. With regard to 
the functions of religion for individuals this point arises: were it suggested reli-
gion relieves anxiety regarding (say) death it might be added that the construc-
tion of heaven, hell and day of judgment introduces new sources of anxiety 
which otherwise would not be there. Again, supposing it is agreed that religion 
may be integrative and increase group identities and loyalties, at the same time 
this may be interdependent with hostility between religious groups, as it has 
been for extended periods in Northern Ireland. A very important feature of ma-
jor world religions has been the tendency for schism to occur e.g. within Chris-
tianity, between Roman Catholic and Protestant, and within Islam, especially 
between Sunni and Shia, but also involving smaller sects. 
13. Karl Marx: Religion Is an Aspect of Alienation and Is  
Ideological  
To understand the human situation Marx makes use of the notion of alienation. 
With respect to capitalism alienation involves such aspects as the worker losing 
control over the disposal of what he himself produces; more generally it would 
be subjection to so-called economic laws like that of supply and demand—which 
are not natural laws and not really laws at all but in fact flow from patterned 
human behaviour itself. Alienation implies loss of control. The failure to under-
stand the source of this loss gives rise to religious interpretation. In the future in 
the unalienated condition of communism—more like an Israeli kibbutz than the 
former Soviet Union—the need for religion would disappear. Hence Marx’s cri-
tique of the “vale of tears”: 
Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffer-
ing and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed 
creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is 
the opium of the people … To call on them to give up their illusions about their 
condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The 
criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of 
which religion is the halo (Marx, 2009 [1844]). 
According to Marx, religion defers happiness and rewards to the after-life, 
teaching the resigned acceptance of existing conditions in this life. Attention is 
thus diverted away from inequalities and injustices in this world by the promise 
of what is to come in the next. Religion has a strong ideological element: reli-
gious beliefs and values often provide justifications for inequalities of wealth and 
power; consider, for instance, the contribution of the Dutch Reformed Church 
within apartheid South Africa. Also, the teaching that “the meek shall inherit the 
earth” may engender attitudes of humility and non-resistance to oppression. We 
would, however, surely want to say that religion can be both revolutionary and 
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conservative; consider, for instance, the conflict in England in the mid-seventeenth 
century between supporters of the king and of parliament where both sides 
claimed religious inspiration. 
Marx says the unsatisfactory nature of the human situation gives rise to relig-
ion. That unsatisfactory nature has many aspects including our vulnerability to 
natural forces and to each other (including economic forces); and the fact that 
we can be overtaken by illness and death at any time. Marx sees religion arising 
from our unsatisfactory condition but affirms that it does not lay bare and con-
front that unsatisfactory condition. That is partially correct but religion can to 
an extent address aspects of it, as is illustrated by Christianity’s message of love: 
were we to love one another, we would become less vulnerable to each other. 
However, the revolutionary character of a religion must to an important extent 
be judged historically. The development of Christian institutions and the inter-
pretation and reinterpretation of its doctrines and practices (as in the Reforma-
tion) have been at the heart of the development of Western civilization itself. 
Seen in that light, the religion’s contribution may perhaps be characterised as 
revolutionary. 
14. Conclusion 
A primary source of religion lies in the fact that early humans employed expla-
nation by reference to both purposive and non-purposive causation but the 
scope and limits of each were not understood. Since human powers are so slight 
relative to the power of natural phenomena on which humans depend, there is a 
motive and impetus for them to seek to understand the natural world using 
concepts (such as agency) associated with purposive causation; indeed this may 
feel empowering. Partly because purposive explanation, although alluding to 
patterned behaviour, tends towards particularism (in that it refers to purposes 
defined within a particular cultural setting), while non-purposive explanation 
tends towards universalism, there have been many religions but only one phe-
nomenon we call science. The religions we are familiar with in the modern 
world may be thought of as the survivors from a much larger pool; they have 
survived because their doctrines are susceptible to reinterpretation in radically 
changed circumstances; indeed even in times of rapid social change (Harris and 
Startup, 1999: ch. 9). This does not mean that they continue to “fit” their respec-
tive societies; as traditional institutions they are typically struggling to “keep up” 
and stay “relevant”. 
The foregrounding of agency and purposive explanation bears upon the 
marked tendency towards anthropomorphism within religion. A notable feature 
of purely human contexts is the way in which the less powerful are expected to 
orient to the more powerful: typically they are expected not just to acknowledge 
the power difference but are also made to display their acceptance of its legiti-
macy. Hence humans typically acknowledge greater power in a religious context 
while understanding it as the source of justification for their own actions. This 
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most often also supplies the crucial element of cosmic or transcendental legiti-
macy to the authority of the most powerful human individuals and groups (as 
with the Egyptian pharaoh): hence an important sense in which religion is con-
servative. Significantly, where the deity is understood to be everywhere (or have 
access to everywhere) and all-knowing this is more effective in connection with 
social control than is purely human sanction. 
Two other basic features of the human situation serve to structure religion: 
the inevitability of death and experiences of a subjective type or of the 
non-material. A “dark cloud” permanently hovering over humanity, death and 
its inevitability are a primary focus of religious interpretation; the perennial 
struggle is to make these meaningful, sometimes even in ways purporting to 
“overcome” death. In a wider sense, religion mediates between the living and the 
dead, and, while doing so, legitimizes practices of the living. The continuity of 
the subjective and of memory contributes to such a notion as that of the soul. It 
is of the essence that humans are symbol-users: religion is highly symbolic and 
probably arises and is shaped at least in part by confusion between the symbol 
and that which is symbolized. Important too, as Freud points out, normative 
elements internalised within individuals e.g. as “conscience”, may be “externa-
lized” i.e. interpreted as communication from the deity or ancestors.  
Through understanding the human mind as the product of evolution, cogni-
tive approaches seek to illuminate the origins and varieties of religion. In this 
connection, Boyer considers beliefs about the supernatural originate from 
knowledge being misapplied from one cognitive domain to another. Yet this 
suggestion seems critically to downplay the contribution of human imaginative 
powers. In a further contribution, Whitehouse relates different forms of memory 
together with certain patterns in community or social ties to contrasting modes 
of religiosity—doctrinally organized or intense and imagistic. Insight is provided 
into a striking dichotomy evident in religious practice. 
Two important sources of variation in religions have been identified. The first 
concerns the orientation in respect of power. One approach gives rise to the 
dualist perspective at the root of major western religions while the other gene-
rates a non-dualist outlook, which underlies prominent religions of the orient. A 
second major source of variation among religions arises from their differing ori-
ginating contexts; it has application to the major dualist occidental religions. 
There is a contrast between a religion experiencing a prolonged early period of 
subordinacy and one experiencing early political dominance in respect of the li-
kelihood of it generating a systematic doctrine subordinating politics to religion. 
A further significant point is that while religion tends to be socially conservative, 
it may have longer-term revolutionary potential. 
In an appraisal of the human condition, it becomes almost harder to explain 
not the presence and/or centrality of religion, but secularization and the cir-
cumstances in which religion may be successfully challenged or marginalized. In 
a modern secular context, we are used to taking the contours of the external 
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world as a neutral, factual “given” to which we may orient instrumentally. While 
the orientations of early humans include instrumentality as an element, the latter 
is embedded within a wider religiously- and magically-shaped worldview. For us, 
as Max Weber indicates, given the character of modernized, bureaucratic, secu-
larized Western society, there has been a “disenchantment of the world”. The 
task of understanding how that disenchantment came about proves to be as 
challenging as that of understanding the origins and significance of the pre-
viously enchanted state. 
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